Introduction
This specification defines message-based facsimile communication over the Internet. It describes a minimum set of capabilities, taking into account those of typical facsimile devices and PCs that can generate facsimile data.
The reason for developing this capability as an email profile is to permit interworking amongst facsimile and email users. For example, it is intended that existing email users be able to send normal messages to lists of users, including facsimile-based recipients, and that other email recipients shall be able to reply to the original and continue to include facsimile recipients. Similarly, it is intended that existing email software work without modification and not be required to process new, or different data structures, beyond what is normal for Internet mail users. Existing email service standards are used, rather than replicating mechanisms which are more tailored to existing facsimile standards, to ensure this compatibility with existing email service.
Services
A facsimile-capable device that uses T.4 [15] and the general switched telephone network (GSTN) is called a "G3Fax device" in this specification. An "IFax device" is an Internet-accessible device capable of sending, receiving or forwarding Internet faxes. A message can be sent to an IFax device using an Internet mail address. A message can be sent to a G3Fax device using an Internet mail address; the message MAY be forwarded via an IFax offramp gateway.
Cases
This specification provides for communication between each of the following combinations: The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [13] .
Communication Protocols
The set of conventions necessary to achieve facsimile-compatible service covers basic data transport, document data formats, message (document) addressing, delivery confirmation, and message security. In this section, the first 4 are covered. The remainder are covered in following sections, along with additional details for addressing and formats.
Transport
This section describes mechanisms involved in the transport between IFAX devices. 
MIME
IFax devices MUST be compliant with MIME [4] , except as noted in Appendix A.
Content
The data format of the facsimile image is based on the minimum set of TIFF for Facsimile [5] , also known as the S profile. Such facsimile data are included in a MIME object by use of the image/TIFF sub-type [12] . Additional rules for the use of TIFF for Facsimile, for the message-based Internet facsimile application, are defined later.
Multipart
A single multi-page document SHOULD be sent as a single multi-page TIFF file, even though recipients MUST process multipart/mixed containing multiple TIFF files. If multipart content is present and processing of any part fails, then processing for the entire message is treated as failing, per [ 
Classic Email Destinations
Messages being sent to normal Internet mail recipients will use standard Internet mail addresses, without additional constraints.
G3Fax Devices
G3Fax devices are accessed via an IFAX offramp gateway, which performs any authorized telephone dial-up.
Address Formats Used by Offramps
When a G3Fax device is identified by a telephone number, the entire address used for the G3fax device, including the number and offramp host reference MUST be contained within standard Internet mail transport fields, such as RCPT TO and MAIL FROM [1, 3] . The address MAY be contained within message content fields, such as <authentic> and <destination> [2, 3], as appropriate.
As for all Internet mail addresses, the left-hand-side (local-part) of an address is not to be interpreted except by the MTA that is named on the right-hand-side (domain). The telephone number format SHOULD conform to [7, 8] . Other formats MUST be syntactically distinct from [7, 8] .
Image File Format
Sending IFax devices MUST be able to write minimum set TIFF files, per the rules for creating minimum set TIFF files defined in TIFF for Facsimile (the S profile) [5] , which is also compatible with the specification for the minimum subset of TIFF-F in [14] . Receiving IFax devices MUST be able to read minimum set TIFF files.
A sender SHOULD NOT use TIFF fields and values beyond the minimum subset of TIFF for Facsimile unless the sender has prior knowledge of other TIFF fields or values supported by the recipient. The mechanism for determining capabilities of recipients is beyond the scope of this document.
Security Considerations

General Directive
This specification is based on use of existing Internet mail. To maintain interoperability with Internet mail, any security to be provided should be part of the of the Internet security infrastructure, rather than a new mechanism or some other mechanism outside of the Internet infrastructure.
Threats and Problems
Both Internet mail and G3Fax standards and operational services have their own set of threats and countermeasures. This section attends only to the set of additional threats which ensue from integrating the two services. This section reviews relevant concerns about Internet mail for IFax environments, as well as considering the potential problems which can result of integrating the existing G3Fax service with Internet mail.
Spoofed Sender
The actual sender of the message might not be the same as that specified in the Sender or From fields of the message content headers or the MAIL FROM address from the SMTP envelope.
In a tightly constrained environment, sufficient physical and software controls may be able to ensure prevention of this problem. The usual solution is through encryption-based authentication, either for the channel or associated with the object, as discussed below.
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It should be recognized that SMTP implementations do not provide inherent authentication of the senders of messages, nor are sites under obligation to provide such authentication. End-to-end approaches such as S/MIME and PGP/MIME are currently being developed within the IETF. These technologies can provide such authentication.
Resources Consumed by Dialout
In addition to the resources normally consumed for email (CPU cycles and disk), offramp facsimile causes an outdial which often imposes significant resource consumption, such as financial cost. Techniques for establishing authorization of the sender are essential to those offramp facsimile services that need to manage such consumption.
Due to the consumption of these resources by dialout, unsolicited bulk email which causes an outdial is undesirable.
Offramp gateways SHOULD provide the ability to authorize senders in some manner to prevent unauthorized use of the offramp. There are no standard techniques for authorization using Internet protocols.
Typical solutions use simple authentication of the originator to establish and verify their identity and then check the identity against a private authorization table.
Originator authentication entails the use of weak or strong mechanisms, such as cleartext keywords or encryption-based data-signing, respectively, to determine and validate the identify of the sender and assess permissions accordingly.
Other control mechanisms which are common include source filtering and originator authentication. Source filtering entails offramp gateway verification of the host or network originating the message and permitting or prohibiting relaying accordingly.
GSTN Authorization Information
Confidential information about the sender necessary to dial a G3Fax recipient, such as sender's calling card authorization number, might be disclosed to the G3Fax recipient (on the cover page), such as through parameters encoded in the G3Fax recipients address in the To: or CC: fields.
Senders SHOULD be provided with a method of preventing such disclosure. As with mechanisms for handling unsolicited faxes, there
are not yet standard mechanisms for protecting such information. Typically authorization needs to be associated to specific senders and specific messages, in order to prevent a "replay" attack which causes and earlier authorization to enable a later dial-out by a different (and unauthorized) sender. A non-malicious example of such a replay would be to have an email recipient reply to all original recipients --including an offramp IFax recipient --and have the original sender's authorization cause the reply to be sent.
Sender Accountability
In many countries, there is a legal requirement that the "sender" be disclosed on a facsimile message. Email From addresses are trivial to fake, so that using only the MAIL FROM [1, 3] or From [2, 3] header is not sufficient.
Offramps SHOULD ensure that the recipient is provided contact information about the offramp, in the event of problems.
The G3Fax recipient SHOULD be provided with sufficient information which permits tracing the originator of the IFax message. Such information might include the contents of the MAIL FROM, From, Sender and Reply-To headers, as well as Message-Id and Received headers.
Message Disclosure
Users of G3Fax devices have an expectation of a level of message privacy which is higher than the level provided by Internet mail without security enhancements.
This expectation of privacy by G3Fax users SHOULD be preserved as much as possible.
Sufficient physical and software control may be acceptable in constrained environments. The usual mechanism for ensuring data confidentially entail encryption, as discussed below. Eavesdropping of senders and recipients is easier on the Internet than GSTN. Note that message object encryption does not prevent traffic analysis, but channel security can help to frustrate attempts at traffic analysis.
Security Techniques
There are two basic approaches to encryption-based security which support authentication and privacy:
5.3.1. Channel Security
As with all email, an IFax message can be viewed as it traverses internal networks or the Internet itself.
Virtual Private Networks (VPN), encrypted tunnels, or transport layer security can be used to prevent eavesdropping of a message as it traverses such networks. It also provides some protection against traffic analysis, as described above.
At the current time various protocols exist for performing the above functions, and are only mentioned here for information. Such protocols are IPSec [17] and TLS [18] .
Object Security
As with all email, an IFax message can be viewed while it resides on, or while it is relayed through, an intermediate Mail Transfer Agent.
Message encryption can be used to provide end-to-end encryption.
At the current time two protocols are commonly used for message encryption and are only mentioned here for information. The two protocols are PGP-MIME [16] and S/MIME [19] . [2] Resnick, P., Editor, "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April 2001.
